Second term (January - March) in Bologna, Ghent or Hamburg
This term offers a profound study of the property rights approach to classical property law and to areas which could be, de lege ferenda, submitted to regimes of property rights.
The courses aim at a full economic understanding of our property institutions, their origin and possible extension. Furthermore, the problem of legitimisation of contracts and private autonomy will be dealt with from both an economic and a legal point of view. Topics and practical examples will be discussed in both private and public law.
A more general purpose of this term is to allow students to make a critical evaluation of the usefulness of the economic approach.
Bologna (University of Bologna - Faculty of Economics)
- Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Law
- Economic Analysis of Contract Law
- Applied Labour Law and Economics
- Corporate Governance
Ghent (University of Ghent - Law Faculty)
- Economic Analysis of Property Law
- Economic Analysis of Contract Law
- Philosophy of Law and Economics
- Economic Analysis of Environmental Law
- Corporate Law and Economics
Hamburg (University of Hamburg - Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft)
- Economic Analysis of Property Law
- Economic Analysis of Contract Law I
- Economic Analysis of Contract Law II
- Philosophical Foundations of Law and Economics
- Public Law and Economics II: Constitutional Economics
- Public Law and Economics II: Tutorial
- Corporation Law and Economics
- Basic Quantitative Methods in Law and Economics
Detailed Course Descriptions
All information is subject to change.
Bologna (University of Bologna - Faculty of Economics)
Economic Analysis of Property Law
Lecturer: Prof. Vincenzo Denicolò
Contents and purpose of the course
The course will explore the potential and the limits of an economic property rights approach to the law of property. It will cover such classic topics as Coase's theorems and the theory of commons and anti-commons. Special emphasis will be placed on the economic analysis of intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, secrets, trademarks). The economic effects of various legal doctrines and issues arising in the field of intellectual property will be analyzed.
Topics
1. The economic functions of property rights
2. Externalities and Coase's theorem
3. Transaction costs and the optimal allocation of property rights
4. Knowledge as a public good
5. The reward theory of intellectual property rights
6. Optimal length and breadth of intellectual property rights
7. Prizes v. patents
8. The contract theory of patents: patents and trade secrets
9. Cumulative innovation
10. Commons and anti-commons
Literature
Cooter, R. and Ulen, T., Law and Economics, 2nd ed., 1996
D. Landes and R. Posner, The economic structure of intellectual property law
S. Scotchmer, Innovation and incentives, MIT Press, 2004
Lecture notes and a reading list will be provided during the course.
Hours: Lectures: 10 x 3
Economic Analysis of Contract Law
Lecturers: Prof. Emanuela Carbonara, Prof. Alberto Monti
Part I: E. Carbonara
This course aims at giving students an overview of the most important insights from the economic analysis of contract law. The first part focuses on the economic foundations of contract law.
Literature - Books
Cooter, R. and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, Latest edition. Chapters 6 and 7.
Schaefer, H.-B. and C. Ott, The Economic Analysis of Contract Law, Edwar Elgar, 2004. Chapters 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.
Unit 1: The general theory of contract law and the economics of contract law
Readings:
- Cooter, R. and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, Chpt. 6.
- Bohnet, I., B. S. Frey and Steffen Huck (2001), More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding American Political Science Review 95: 131-144.
- Williamson, O.E. (1983), Credible commitments: using hostages to support exchange, American Economic Review, 73:519.
- Williamson, O.E. (1998), Opportunistic Behavior in Contracts, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 2: 703 – 710.
Unit 2: Default Rules and Information Revelation
Incomplete Contracts
Default Rules
Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and the Problem of Information Revelation
The Hadley and the Mitigation Rule
Readings:
- Ayres, I and R. Gertner (1989), Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, Yale Law Journal, vol.99: 87-130.
- Bebchuck, L.A. and Shavell (1991), Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract. The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, J, Law, Econ. & Org. Vol.7(2): 284-312.
- Posner E. A. (1999), Contract remedies: foreseability, precaution, causation and mitigation, in Bouckaert, B. and G. De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 4620.
- Geis, G. (2004), Empirically assessing Hadley v. Baxendale, Univ. of Alabama School of Law.
Unit 3: The economics of the remedies for breach of contracts and the Paradox of Compensation
Efficient breach
Specific performance
Expectation, reliance and restitution
Readings:
- Cooter, R. and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, 6th Edition, 2004. chpt. 7.
- Cooter, R. (1985), Unity in Tort Contract and Property: the Model of Precaution, California Law Review.
- Ulen, T. S. (1998), Specific Performance, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics.
- Sloof, R., H. Oosterbeek, A. Riedl and J. Sonnemans (2001), Breach Remedies, Reliance and Renegotiation, available online at www.ssrn.com.
Unit 4: Consumer protection: mandatory rules and warranties
Readings:
- Schaefer, H.-B. and C. Ott, The Economic Analysis of Contract Law, Edwar Elgar, 2004. Chapters 14, 15.
- Akerlof, G.A., (1970), The market for lemons, quality, uncertainty and the market mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488-500.
- Emons, W. (1989), The theory of warranty contracts, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 3(1).
- Parisi, F. (2004), The harmonization of legal warranties in European law: an economic analysis, American Journal of Comparative Law, 52(2).
- Priest, G.L. (1981), A theory of consumer product warranty, Yale Law Journal 90: 1297-1352.
Unit 5: Relational contracts, “soft law” and the harmonization of contract law
Readings:
- Hviid, M. (1999), Long-term contracts and relational contracts, in Bouckaert, B. and G. De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 4200.
- Carbonara, E. and F. Parisi (2005), The Economics of Legal Harmonization, GMU School of Law Working Paper 05-40.
- Eisenberg, M.A. (2000), Why there is no law of relational contracts, 94 Northwestern Law Review, 847.
- Scott, R. E. (2000), The case for formalism in relational contracts, 94 Northwestern Law Review, 847.
Part II: A. Monti
Unit 1: The enforceability of promises
Readings:
Topic 1 - The requirement of Consideration. § 71 Requirement of Exchange; Types of Exchange.
- Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts Copyright (c) 1981, The American Law Institute Rules and Principles, Chapter 4 - Formation of Contracts – Consideration.
Topic 2 - Contracts Without Consideration. § 90 Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance.
- UNIDROIT 2004
- PECL 2002 (Principles of European Contract Law)
Unit 2: Contract formation: offer, acceptance and the battle of forms
Readings:
- Omri Ben-Shahar (2004), An ex-ante view of the battle of the forms: Inducing parties to draft reasonable terms, University of Michigan.
- UNIDROIT 2004
- PECL 2002 (Principles of European Contract Law)
- Unit 3: Contracts of adhesion
- Readings:
- Todd d. Rakoff (1983), Contracts of adhesion: an essay in reconstruction, 96 Harvard Law Review, 1174.
- Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.
Hours: Lectures: 8 x 3 hours
Applied Labour Law and Economics
Lecturer: Prof. Andrea Ichino
Contents and purpose of the course
This course offers an overview of the main concepts and theories proposed by economists to study human relationships characterized by the presence of uncertainty and private information of the parties involved. We will start by considering situations in which one party has a characteristic that cannot be observed by the other party. These situations can lead to equilibria with adverse selection (i.e., only subjects with the least attractive private endowment offer themselves for a relationship) and in some cases to the complete collapse of the possibility of a relationship. We will study if an how the informed party may try to signal her private characteristic of whether the least informed party can design mechanisms to screen the best partner for the relationship. The next step will be to consider situations in which one party ma take actions that cannot be observed by the other party. In these cases, it may happen that the least informed party would like the potential partner to take certain actions but cannot be sure that these actions will actually be taken. Economic theory studies different solutions to this problem, some of which will be considered in the course. Applications of these concepts and problems can be found in many aspects of our daily life, not necessarily aspects that one would typically classify as economics (think, for example, at how the existence of uncertainty and private information shapes the “market for dates” in the University of Bologna). During the course, we will consider examples drawn from the economics of labour relations, financial contracts, insurance contracts, education, the family, the law and many more.
Topics
1 The employment contract as a stage for our analysis
1.1 The employer and the employee: typical assumptions
1.2 “Non-orthodox” views on the employment relationships
1.3 The phases of the employment relationship
2 The selection of workers at the beginning of an employment relationship
2.1 Adverse selection, Pareto optimality and Rawlsian social justice (Mas Collell et al, (1995) ch. 13)
2.2 Signalling and welfare: the problem of compulsory maternity leaves (Mas Collell et al, (1995) ch. 13)
2.3 Screening through probation and upward sloping wage profiles (Lazaer (1995))
2.4 Screening through “pay based on performance” (Lazaer (1999))
2.5 Probation when monitoring is the only way to screen heterogeneous agents (Ichnio and Muehlheusser (2004))
3 The development of an employment relationship
3.1 The canonical principal-agent model (Gibbons and Waldman (1999))
3.2 Imperfect measurement of performance (Baker (1992))
3.3 Pay based on input or output and allocation of responsibilities (Prendergast (2002))
3.4 Relative performance evaluations (Holmstrom (1979))
3.5 Relative performance and tournaments (Lazaer and Rosen (1981))
3.6 The emergence of hierarchies when effort and output are not contractible (Prendergast (2002))
3.7 “Up-or-out” contracts (Kahn and Huberman (1988))
3.8 The “Peter principle” (Lazaer (2004))
3.9 Moral Hazard in teams (Holstrom (1982))
3.10 Efficiency Wages as an incentive device (Gibbons and Waldman (1999))
3.11 Career concerns (Holstrom (1999))
Literature: Readings will be provided.
Hours: Lectures: 8 x 3 hours
Corporate Governance
Lecturers: Prof. Alessandro Pomelli, Prof. Marco Bigelli
Contents and purpose of the course
The course covers recent developments in the theory of the firm and corporate governance. There will be 8 meetings. Each meeting will be 3 hours long. We warmly recommend students to make the readings suggested for each of the lectures (and especially for lecture 1) ahead of each lecture.
Topics
1) Introduction to corporate governance
2) Corporate governance and the theory of the firm
3) Agency theory and corporate governance
4) Managerial remuneration and corporate governance
5) The role of directors in corporate governance
6) The role of shareholders in corporate governance
7) Corporate scandals: Enron, Parmalat and the ensuing reforms
8) Large shareholders and corporate governance
Literature:
M.Becht, P.Bolton, A.Roell, Corporate governance and control, 2002, NBER Working paper 9371
R. Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, OUP, 2004
Hours: Lectures: 8 x 3 hours
Ghent (University of Ghent - Law Faculty)
Economic Analysis of Property Law
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gideon Parchomovski
Contents and purpose of the course
This course offers a profound study of the property-rights approach to classical property law and to areas which could be, de lege ferenda, submitted to regimes of property rights. The course aims at a full economic understanding of our property institutions, their origin and possible extension. There is a written open book exam. Each student will be required to make a short comment on the economic background of a case in property law. Students are evaluated on their participation in the lectures and seminars as well as on their case study and exam.
Syllabus:a syllabus for the lectures will be provided
Chapter I Property Rights: History, Property Rights’ Approach, Transcultural Perspectives.
Chapter II The Tragedy of the Commons. Common versus Individual Property Rights.
Chapter III The Tragedy of the Anti-commons. Fragmentation and Transaction Costs.
Chapter IV Property Rights and Internalization of Costs
Chapter V Possession and Limitation Statutes
Chapter VI Recordation of intrests
Chapter VII The Economics of Zoning Law
Chapter VIII Securities and Priority Rights
Materials: materials for the seminars will be provided
Literature
COOTER, R., and ULEN, T., Law and Economics, Scott, Forsman and Company, 1988.
ACKERMAN, B.A., Economic Foundations of Property Law, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1975.
BARZEL, Y., Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
PEJOVICH, S., Towards an Economic theory of the Creation and Specification of Property Rights, Association for Social Economics, 1972.
LEPAGE, H., Pourquoi la propriété?, Hachette, Collection Pluriel, Paris, 1984.
POSNER, R.A., Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd ed. 1986.
ELLICKSON, R., Law without order, How neighbours settle disputes.
Hours: Lectures: 10 x 2 hours, Seminars: 5 x 2 hours, Student Papers: 15 x 1 hour
Topics of seminars - Seminars will be organised on the basis of selected texts on topics such as property and biodiversity, property and the environment, protection of cultural heritage.
Economic Analysis of Contract Law
Lecturer: Professor Gerrit de Geest
Contents and purpose of the course
This course focuses on the economic logic behind contracts, and on comparative contract law and economics. Contract drafting requires much more than knowing the legal boundaries within which parties have to operate. Lawyers (and economists) also need an in-depth understanding of the functions of contract types and clauses. This course analyzes contracts in terms of costs, incentives, risks and transaction costs. It also discusses strategic aspects, such as the (re)negotiation position before and during the contract, techniques to induce parties to reveal information, optimal strategies in auctions, and the signing-without-reading problem. General issues include: the optimal level of detail and third-party governance in contracts; the optimal amount of pressure on obligations; the optimal allocation of commercial and other risks; the optimal timing of performance and payment; self-enforcing contracts; and general techniques to incentivize monitors and hard-to-monitor promisors. Applications include franchise contracts, lease contracts, lawyer-client contracts, law firms, royalty contracts, contracts in the entertainment industry, oil production contracts, distribution contracts, sale on consignment, resale agents, warranty clauses, forum clauses, and most-favoured-customer clauses. Special attention will be paid to severance pay and termination clauses in employment contracts.
Comparative contract law and economics is a relatively new field that tries to explain differences among legal systems with respect to contract law, and find out which contract rules are optimal.
Syllabus and course materials will be provided.
Literature
COOTER, Robert and ULEN, Tom, Law and Economics, most recent edition,
WESLEY, chapters 6 and 7 on contract law.
Other papers: for a list, see course materials.
Philosophy of Law and Economics
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Frank Van Dun
Contents and purpose of the course
The main theme of the course is the distinction between model-theoretic and action-theoretic approaches in the study of human affairs, in particular law and economics. We focus on their presuppositions, assumptions and implications. The aim is to assess their relevance for the study and analysis of various types of real-world situations (contexts of action, interaction, decision-making and conflict-resolution--for example, convivial orders, communities, open markets, formal organisations--and the varying ways and degrees in which these refer to laws, norms, rules and commands).
The framework of analysis that underlies the course allows us to compare theories and methods proposed by various schools of philosophy, economics, law and politics.
Students should be willing to write a paper in which they explore some of the philosophical dimensions discussed in class concerning a topic (within the broad field of the program) that is of special interest to them.
Literature
Reader with excerpts of articles will be provided.
Economic Analysis of Environmental Law
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Johan Albrecht
Topics
1. Instruments for environmental policy; command-and-control versus market-based instruments, optimal solutions for environmental problems, agency theory, rent seeking,...
2. First-best and second-best environments; climate policy, carbon taxation and the double dividend debate
3. Energy systems; system dynamics, the use of economic instruments, institutional analysis of carbon lock-in
Literature
Environmental Economics, An Elementary Introduction, R. Turner, D. Pearce and I. Bateman (Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1994)
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, T. Tietenberg (Addison Wesley, 2006, ISBN: 0-321-03128-8)
Environmental Economics, C.D. Kolstad (Oxford University Press, 2000)
Corporate Law and Economics
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Christoph van der Elst and Dr. Peter Coussement
Contents and purpose of the course
This course is divided in two parts. The first part studies the economic views on corporations and corporate constituents. The most important characteristics of a corporation and its economic (dis-)advantages will be discussed: legal personality, limited liability, centralized management and free transferability of shares. Next, legal instruments to mitigate the conflicts between management and shareholders and between controlling and minority shareholders are assessed. Mechanisms that mitigate these conflicts are inter alia the market for corporate control and takeovers, remuneration schemes, disclosure of information, independent directors, board committees, internal control mechanisms, external audit, empowering shareholders, squeeze-outs, etc.
The second part of the course includes the principle agent theory, theory of the firm, risk and transaction analysis, risk spreading, the firm as a nexus of contracts, corporate bankruptcy theory and governance in bankruptcy.
The goals of the course is providing students the skills to analyse, discuss and solve, from a legal and economic angle, corporate, insolvency and governance related items.
Literature
Frank Easterbrook, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics
Th. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law
Students will receive a syllabus with reading assignments.
Hours: lectures of 3 hours
Hamburg (University of Hamburg - Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft)
Economic Analysis of Property Law
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Thomas Eger
Contents and purpose of the course
The course will explore the potential and the limits of an economic property rights approach to the law of property as lawyers conceive it. It will try to integrate legal and economic discourse in traditional and in modern areas of the law. On the basis of Cooter
and Ulen's textbook the conflicting conceptions of ownership in civil law, common law and economic theory will be evaluated. The limits of property law will be tested with respect to patents, rights to information, reputation and organs or tissue of the human body.
The different treatment of adverse possession and good faith acquisition in common and civil law will be compared. The emphasis of the course lays in a cost benefit analysis of entitlement problems on the basis of property rules, liability rules and rules of inalienability and rules of non-protection.
Literature
Cooter, R. and Ulen, T., Law and Economics, latest edition
Students will receive a syllabus with reading assignments.
Hours: Lectures: 2 hours per week
Economic Analysis of Contract Law I
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Stefan Voigt
Contents and purpose of the course
In this first part of the course the economic theory of contract will be discussed. The concept of perfect contract will be analysed in order to find out whether current doctrines in contract law may be understood as devices to cure imperfections in individual rationality and market environment. The second part of the course will be devoted to problems of consumer protection. In the legal literature the need to protect 'weaker' contract parties, such as consumers, is stressed (redistribution by contract regulation). The economic theory offers an alternative approach to problems of consumer protection. A number of doctrines in contract law and remedies in contract regulation may be understood as devices to cure asymmetric information and prevent adverse selection ('markets for lemons'). Efficient breach of contracts will be another topic. Because the goal of consumer protection is the underlying rationale of many market regulations, the relation between contract law and regulatory devices will also be examined. Topics discussed in the second part of the course are e.g.: disclosure rules, regulation of advertising, warranties and standard form contracts.
Literature
Cooter, R. and Ulen, T., Law and Economics, Glenview, Scott, Foresman & Co, latest edition, p.161-258
Schäfer/Ott, Economic Analysis of Civil Law, 2004, Edward Elgar
Students will receive a syllabus with reading assignments.
Hours: Lectures: 2 hours per week
Economic Analysis of Contract Law II
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Thomas Eger
Content and purpose of the course
This course deals with the specific problems of long term business relationships and explores the legal and economic implications of contracts that are characterised by multiple transactions and business complexity. It focuses on modern types of contracts such as leasing, factoring, interest pooling and joint venture agreements. The analysis starts with the key problems of contract incompleteness, high degrees of uncertainty and needs for constant adjustment. It the turns to the reconstruction of the complete contract through self enforcement mechanisms or interpretation and gap filling by courts. The wider aim of the course is to provide a functional understanding of contracts and their use in legal practice starting from the discrete, via relational contracts and up to the nexus of contracts in an organizational hierarchy.
Literature: to be announced
Lectures: 2 hours per week
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Economics
Lecturer: Dr. Matthew Braham
Contents and purpose of the course:
This course will examine selected topics in the philosophical underpinnings of social welfare judgements. In this regard we will deal variously with the nature of ethical decisions, utilitarianism and interpersonal comparisons, rational choice, social contract theories, equality, and freedom and rights. We will also give special attention to the practical implications of welfare analyses by looking at specific conceptual issues involved in the economic analysis of legal rules and institutions, e.g. ‘can the task of law be reduced to efficiency and wealth maximization’ or ‘is fairness a criterion for assessing legal rules’.
Literature
Sen, Amartya K, and Bernard A O Williams, eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1955), Cardinal welfare, individual ethics, and interpersonal comparison of utility, Journal of Political Economy 63, 309-321.
Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S. (2002). Fairness versus Welfare. Cambridge, MA: Harvard (selected chapters).
Posner, R.A. (1979). Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory. Journal of Legal Studies 8, 103-140.
Smith, A. (1759, 1966), The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Repr. of the edition by D. Stewart (Bohn Edition), London, 1853, New York: Kelley (selected chapters).
Sen, A. (1982), Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard (selected chapters).
Hours: Lectures: 2 hours per week
Public Law and Economics II: Constitutional Economics
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Stefan Voigt
Contents and purpose of the course
This class deals with the economic analysis of constitutions. It has four major parts: (1) conceptual foundations, (2) normative constitutional theory, (3) the (economic) effects of constitutions and (4) the determinants of constitutional choice and change. After successful completion of the class, students will be capable to evaluate the possible consequences of alternative constitutional rules autonomously but also to develop proposals for constitutional rules on their own.
Literature
to be announced
Hours: Lectures: 2 hours per week
Public Law and Economics II: Tutorial
Lecturer: Sang-Min Park
Contents and purpose of the course
Students frequently show reservations concerning the use of econometrics because the underlying methods appear very abstract – and they are often taught to re-enforce that impression. This tutorial seeks to reduce these reservations by showing the great relevance of econometrics for the economic analysis of law; here with special emphasis on the economic analysis of constitutions. Subjects include Ordinary Least Squares, time series analysis, but also techniques for principal components. These will not be presented in the abstract but drawing on concrete examples taken from the subject of the class. This will not only enable students to understand the most important contributions but also to ask a number of critical questions regarding the adequacy of methods used.
Literature
to be announced
Hours: Lectures: 2 hours per week
Corporation Law and Economics
Lecturer: Dr. Alessandro Pomelli
Contents and purpose of the course
It is common ground that corporations have become the most important makers of waves in the world economy. As a by-product of this development the law of business organisations itself has been pushed ahead by economic forces. The modern economic analysis of law allows for a more principled and systematic approach to the rationale of the relevant legal rules for corporations. This course will study why and when business organisations are preferred to long-term contractual arrangements and what governance structures may be expected to prevail. The search for efficient legal instruments is motivated by the inquiry to what extent market mechanisms may be employed or mimicked to improve corporate governance. In exploring the core functions of corporation law this course will also rely on insights from corporate finance and the regulation of securities. Students will be familiarised with the basic economic concepts for business organisations and the most important issues in the law of corporations. A syllabus with reading assignments will be distributed. Coursework will focus on the problems addressed by the materials and students are encouraged to stimulate the debate in class.
Literature: Berle/Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932)
Clark, Corporate Law (1986),
Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law (1988),
Easterbrook/Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991),
Cheffins, Company Law - Theory, Structure and Operation (1997)
Kraakman/Davies/Hansmann/Hertig/Hopt/Kanda/Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law - A Comparative and Functional Approach (2004)
Further reading materials will be supplied during the course.
Hours: Lectures: 2 hours per week
Note: The University of Manchester offers a course in the third term which has considerable overlap with this course.
Basic Quantitative Methods in Law and Economics
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Michael Funke
Contents and purpose of the course
This course has two principal objectives:
(a) To provide a simple and informal introduction to elementary quantitative methods. The course will cover some of the techniques most widely used in research in the social sciences and economics. The course will be taught at a very elementary level. It will not include theory of econometrics or mathematical proofs and concentrate on the practical application of econometric routines. It is planned on the assumption that those taking the course have no retained knowledge of statistics and very little of mathematics.
(b) To introduce the statistical package Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), and to show how this can be used on a computer to perform all the relevant calculations and manipulations.
Although at the end of the course students will not be entitled to a certificate stating that they are a qualified statistician, they should be able to use SPSS to undertake a wide range of statistical exercises. The expectation is that the students will be able to read a chapter or article which uses quantitative methods, to understand what the author has done and why he or she has done it, and reflect critically about the methods used and the results obtained. The students should also learn how to formulate and test hypotheses on the basis of various data-sets. That is, they will understand the nature and procedure of a typical empirical analysis.
Literature: to be announced
Hours: Lectures: 2 hours per week
